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Abstract
For Travelers Dilemma and Minimal E¤ort Coordination games, the unconditional
regret matching (URM) procedure predicts outcomes close to the experimental ones.
This supports a claim that the URM procedure can be well suited to predict the
behavior of experimental subjects in repeated games.
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1 Introduction
We argue that the behavior of experimental subjects in a repeated game can be viewed as a
consequence of following the URM procedure proposed in Hart and Mas-Colell (2000, 2001),
hereafter HM1.
We implement URM in a repeated Travelers Dilemma game (TDG) originating in Basu
(1994) and a Minimum E¤ort Coordination game (MECG) introduced in Van Huyck et al.
(1990) to match the experimental outcomes in Capra et al. (1999) (CGGH) and Goeree
and Holt (2005) (GH). Both games belong to the little treasures of game theory(Goeree
and Holt, 2001) and they have been extensively studied in the literature; see Anderson et
al. (2001), Rubinstein (2006) and Eichberger and Kelsey (2011) among others. In Goeree
and Holt (2001), experiments show that outcomes can be highly sensitive to the change in
payo¤ structure which can produce outcomes at odds with the prediction of the Nash equi-
librium. Standard explanations of deviations from the Nash equilibrium are the Quantal
vladislav.damjanovic@durham.ac.uk
1See also Young (2007).
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Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey,1995) and k-level bounded rationality (Stahl
and Wilson, 1995) among others. Eichberger and Kelsey (2011) show that the experimen-
tal outcomes of treasure games may be a consequence of experimental subjects perceiving
opponentsbehavior as ambiguous.
We show that in the short run, the URM procedure predicts outcomes close to the
experimental ones evidenced in CGGH and GH. In case of TDG, the game departure from
a Nash equilibrium is temporary since in the long run, and irrespective of cost, the joint
play converges to the unique Nash equilibrium. In the case of the MECG, the joint play
converges to Nash equilibria that are inversely related to the cost parameter. We also discuss
dynamics of joint play towards equilibrium induced by URM with bounded memory (see
Saran and Serrano, 2013).
2 Regret Matching
Following HM (2001), consider a particular player i from a group of players N = f1; 2; ::ng
engaged in a game against her opponent(s), playing an action sit 2 S at time t. Let
uit =
1
t
P
t0t u
i
t0(s
i
t0 ; s
 i
t0 ) be the realized average payo¤ she received up to time t given the
history hit :=
  
sit0 ; s
 i
t0

; t0 = 1; 2; ::; t

which is a collection of her own actions and the actions
of her opponents denoted by s it0 : Let u
i
t(s) =
1
t
P
t0t u
i
t0(s; s
 i
t0 ) be the average payo¤ she
would receive had she played constant action s in all periods t0  t and all other players
played as they did. Then
rt(s) = ut(s)  ut (1)
is her unconditional regret of not playing action s: URM prescribes playing each action s
in the next period with a probability proportional to the positive part of its unconditional
regret:
pt+1(s) = [rt(s)]+ =
X
s0
[rt(s)]+ : (2)
In the long run, URM leads to no-regret for all players, and their joint actions converge to the
set of coarse-correlated equilibria CCE (Moulin and Vial, 1978; Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000;
Young, 2004). For a two-player game, CCE is a joint probability distribution P = (ps;s0)
over S1  S2 if
X
(s1;s2)2S1S2
u1(s
1; s2)ps1s2 
X
(s1;s2)2S1S2
u1(x
1; s2)ps1s2 ; for all x
1 2 S1 (3)
X
(s1;s2)2S1S2
u1(s
1; s2)ps1s2 
X
(s1;s2)2S1S2
u2(s
1; y2)ps1s2 ; for all y
2 2 S2:
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3 TD Game
Similar to CGGH, the actions are integers from 80 to 200; i.e. si 2 S := f80; 81; :::199; 200g
and N = f1; 2; ::; 10g: The ith players payo¤ function is:
ui(si; sj) = min(si; sj) + C  sign(sj   si); (4)
with i; j 2 N; i 6= j. For any value of punishment/reward parameter C > 1 claiming
the minimal amount, s = 80 is a unique Nash equilibrium. The experimental outcomes
(CGGH) presented in Figure 1 show an inverse relationship between average claim and
parameter C:
The sequences of playersclaims in period t; fs1t ; s2t ; ::; s10t g are generated by URM and
the average claim is st = (1=n)
Pn
i=1 s
i
t; to which we refer as the claim in period t. Initially,
si0; i = 1; 2::; 10 are uniformly drawn from S: In each subsequent round, t = 1; 2; ::; T players
are randomly (uniformly) matched and their payo¤s are calculated by (4). Then, given a
history hit; action s
i
t+1 2 S is played with a probability prescribed by (2). The expected
claims averaged over N = 1000 simulations for 10 rounds exhibit an inverse relationship
with C as shown in Figure 1.
For intermediary values of the punishment parameter C, the last period claims reported
in CGGH are inside 95% condence intervals. As C increases, the condence intervals move
downward, indicating an inverse relationship between the average claim and C: To produce
a better match with experimental outcomes, one can use generalized regrets (Hart and
Mas-Colell, 2001) to transform positive regrets di¤erently across players and actions.
The convergence to equilibrium is illustrated by averaging over N simulated claims2 at
period T for each C = 5 : 5 : 80. As shown by simulations (left-hand panel in Figure 2), the
expected claims are not only decreasing in costs but they also decline with T and converge
to the unique Nash equilibrium s = 80. Moreover, for each value of C, the claim per period
rests at the Nash equilibrium in a nite time T inversely related to C:
Evolutions of expected claims (averaged over 200 simulated paths) for di¤erent C (Figure
2) show that: (i) for all t, there is a strict ordering of average paths preserving the inverse
relationship between the expected claims and punishment C and (ii) there is a critical C
so that all paths corresponding to C < C are non-monotonic, and all paths with C  C
are monotonically decreasing.
4 Minimum-E¤ort Coordination Game
In MECG, N = f1; 2; ::; 10g and actions (e¤orts) of player i; si 2 S := f110; 111; :::169; 170g
are chosen as in GH. The payo¤ function is:
2Initially, N is chosen to be larger to obtain a smoother distribution of claims.
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Figure 1: Expected claims (bold line) for di¤erent costs C with 95% (grey area) and 99% (between
dashed lines) condence intervals. Data from CGGH are presented by circles.
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Figure 2: Average claims in period T and their evolutions in time.
ui(si; sj) = min
 
si; sj
  csi; (5)
with i; j 2 N; and the cost per unit of e¤ort c < 1: In this game, any common e¤ort s is a
Nash equilibrium.
We focus on the dynamics of e¤ort in round t; dened as st = (1=N)
PN
i=1 s
i
t . The initial
e¤orts are uniformly drawn from S: In round t+ 1; given histories hit, actions s
i
t+1 2 S are
played with probabilities proportional to their unconditional regrets calculated by (1) and
(5).
In Figure 3, the expected e¤orts for low and high values of c are presented together with
experimental ones (GH) averaged across three di¤erent laboratory sessions. In line with the
risk-dominance criterion,3 there is an inverse relationship between equilibrium e¤orts and
costs. In equilibrium, all players coordinate on the same action after some rounds as shown
in the left-hand panel of Figure 4.
To learn more about convergence to equilibrium and equilibrium selection, we calculate
an average e¤ort for N = 100 simulations for di¤erent c at periods T = 10; 500; 1000 (right-
hand panel of Figure 4). Convergence to the limiting average e¤ort is clearly established
as the di¤erence between average e¤orts in T = 500 (red line) and T = 1000 is negligible.
The equilibrium e¤ort is a strictly decreasing function of the cost parameter in some range
of intermediary values of c. The highest e¤ort is selected for some range of the lowest
3A unilateral increase for e = 1 will lead to a decrease in the payo¤ for the amount c while a
unilateral decrease for e = 1 will lead to a decrease in the payo¤ for the amount 1  c: Like in a 2x2
game when c < (>)1=2; choosing a higher (lower) e¤ort is a risk dominant action (see HG, 2005).
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Figure 3: Expected e¤orts (averaged over 1000 simulations) during the rst ten periods with 95%
(grey area) and 99% (dashed lines) condence intervals. Experimental data from GH are presented
by dots.
Figure 4: Evolutions of e¤orts and convergence to equilibria.
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values of c, while the lowest e¤ort is selected for some range of highest cost values, which
partly conforms with the equilibrium prediction based on maximization of potential4 which
is supported in an experiment by Van Hyick et al. (1990).
5 URM with Finite Memory
As in Saran and Serrano (2012), we introduce bounded memory in the players strategy
assuming that she remembers the last m  1 rounds, so that (1) becomes
rmt (s) =
1
m
tX
t0=t m+1
 
uit0(s; s
 i
t0 )  uit0(sit0 ; s it0 )

for all t  m (6)
with the initial history being generated by URM
rmt (s) =
1
t
tX
t0=1
 
uit0(s; s
 i
t0 )  uit0(sit0 ; s it0 )

for all t < m: (7)
Evolutions of expected actions (averaged over N = 200) for both games with di¤erent
initial conditions, costs, and memories are shown in Figure 5. To check for the robustness of
our results with respect to the initial conditions, we choose the initial distribution of claims
f3; [80; ::; 194]; 7; [195; ::; 200]g by uniformly drawing 3 claims from [80,..,194] and 7 claims
from [195; ::; 200]5. The bold black line in the left-hand panel provides a simulation for TDG
with C = 5.
Expected claims with nite memories m = 100; 50; 20 converge faster to the Nash as
compared to the unbounded memory case. The shorter the memory, the faster is the
convergence. However, by further decreasing the memory, the memory would, at some
point, be insu¢ cient to learn Nash and the dynamics could exhibit cycle-like behavior as
for m = 9 (red line). The exemption is m = 1; where we have convergence to the Nash6:
Simulations show that for small C initially the learning process goes towards higher
claims until the information content (history) is su¢ cient for URM to learn rightdirection.
Necessary conditions for that to happen are that the initial claims should not be too close
in action space and that the memory should not be too short, i.e. m > 1. For example,
for degenerate distributions si0 = 180; i = 1; ::; 10; and distributions with initial claims in
a small vicinity of either boundary, the non-monotonicity disappears. Further simulations
indicate that the non-monotonicity of average claims for small costs is robust with respect
to the wide range of initial conditions.
4Maximization of the potential will select 170 for all c < 1=2; 110 for all c > 1=2, while for c = 1=2,
any equilibrium e¤ort can be selected (Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
5In Rubinstein (2005), aggregated data show that in one-shot TDG, 70% of the claims were in
close vicinity of the maximal claim.
6It can be shown that when m = 1, the average claims decrease: st  st 1.
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Figure 5: Evolutions of expected claims (C = 5) and expected e¤orts (c = 0:01; 0:08)
For MECG, the expected e¤orts are shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 5. Here,
shortening the memory does not accelerate the convergence to the Nash as shown for the
distribution of initial e¤orts f10; [110; 111]g with c = 0:01 and memories m = 1; 10 (black
lines) as compared to the unbounded memory case (black bold line). However, for c = 0:8
and initial distribution of claims f2; [110; ::; 115]; 8; [165; 170]g, shortening the memory m =
5; 15 (red broken lines) accelerates the convergence to the Nash.
Our simulations suggest that URMwith a nite memory may converge to a CCE di¤erent
from Nash. For related results with nite memory in conditional regret matching, see Saran
and Serrano (2006). It would be desirable to get a full characterization of CCEs. Below,
we describe one subset of CCE for TDG.
Proposition 1 In a TD game with B   A  C > 1, the following joint probability distrib-
ution represents the CCE equilibrium
pzz = p; pyy = 1  p:
where y  z + C; (1  p)(y   z)  C   1; p  C 1
2C 1 ;
Proof. Following (3), we need to show that when Player 1 commits to follow the mediators
advice before it has been seen, the unconditional expectation of her payo¤ is at least as high
as her expected payo¤s from playing any other strategy provided that her opponent commits.
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Since the game is symmetric, we consider one player with the unconditional expected payo¤
UCC = pz + (1   p)y: i) Consider any strategy x; such that x < z: The expected pay o¤
is x + C; and to ensure that this strategy is not preferable, it must be pz + (1   p)y >
z  1+C  x+C , (1  p)(y  z) > C   1: ii) For x = z; the payo¤ is pz+(1  p)(z+C),
and the necessary condition is pz + (1   p)y > pz + (1   p)(z + C) , y  z + C: iii) if
z < x < y; the necessary condition is pz + (1   p)y > p(z   C) + (1   p)(y   1 + C) ,
p  C 1
2C 1 ; iv) if x  y, the necessary condition is always satised.
The CCE may deliver a higher expected payo¤ for a lower C. The maximum UCC =
B   C + 1 + C 1
2C 1 is achieved when y = B; z = B   2C + 2, p = C 12C 1 and it declines in C.
6 Conclusion
In our setting, agents learn to play the Nash equilibrium and in contrast to CGGH and
GH, deviations from rationality are temporary. This is expected since TDG is a dominance
solvable and MECG is a potential game and, as pointed out in Hart (2005), there exist
adaptive heuristics that lead to Nash equilibrium. The initial conditions do not a¤ect the
equilibrium outcome, but can a¤ect the dynamics towards equilibrium.
Our simulations do also show that the nature of the equilibrium outcome in games with
nite memory URM could be di¤erent from the case with innite histories. Shortening
memory may lead to Pareto improvement as in TDG. This should be further investigated.
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